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Let Them Do As They Have Promised
Laura Berg*
Foreword
The Honorable Robert C. Belloni
The Northwest Indians lived in a land of plenty. They had game, roots,
berries, and especially fish from the Columbia River system in abundance.
The first white occupants of the region—Russian traders, French fur
trappers, and later American explorers—did not disturb this lifestyle. In the
19th Century, however, it became American policy to obtain more land for
white settlers. From its position of strength, the United States treated with
the Indians to cede to its vast acreages, reserving to the Indians smaller
parcels for living areas. To augment the meager resources of these
reservations, the Indians retained certain off-reservation rights. One of these
was the right to fish at their "usual and accustomed places in common with
the citizens of the Territory." See e.g., Article 3, Yakima Treaty, June 9, 1855.
Substantially identical treaties were signed in 1855 by many Northwest
tribes. The Yakimas, Nez Perce, Umatillas, and Warm Springs Indians now hold
those treaty rights on the upper Columbia River. At first, the catch of the white
fishermen did not prevent the Indians from harvesting sufficient salmon for the
traditional uses—subsistence, ceremonial purposes and trade with other tribes.
There was no need for an exact interpretation of the treaty language because the
fish were plentiful so there were no serious disputes. As more and more settlers
arrived, however, they began to farm, mine, and log the land. These activities
diverted water and covered river beds with silt which harmed spawning grounds.
White commercial fishermen devised mechanical methods of catching vast
quantities of salmon. Then came the most damaging change of all, the
hydroelectric dams, built to furnish cheap electrical power.
By the early 1960's, the number of salmon returning from the Pacific
Ocean to the Indians' upriver fishing sites had so diminished that the
Indians' accustomed usage of the fish resource could not be met. Each year
the problem became worse. Failing to get help from the state or federal

* Laura Berg is the Public Information Manager for the Columbia River Inter-Tribal
Fish Commission and Editor of the Wana Chinook Tymoo newsmagazine. She has over
fifteen years of experience working with the native tribes of the Pacific Northwest.

311

West

Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 2008

governments, fourteen individual members of the Yakima Nation brought a
lawsuit in federal court seeking to establish that the 1855 treaties preserved
and protected their aboriginal right to fish, a right that could not be
impaired by non-Indians. This came to be called the Sohappy case, named
after the principal plaintiff, David Sohappy.
At the same time, the United States, through the person of George D.
Dysart, Assistant Regional Solicitor of the Department of the Interior, was
planning legal action against the State of Oregon requiring Oregon to manage
the fish resource in a manner that would assure the Indians a fair and equitable
share of the salmon and steelhead destined to reach the Indians' "usual and
accustomed" fishing places. The Yakimas, Nez Perce, Umatillas, and Warm
Springs tribes immediately requested and were granted permission to intervene
as plaintiffs, along with the United States. This new litigation sought essentially
the same relief as the Sohappy case and effectively merged those issues into one
lawsuit entitled United States v. Oregon. Laura Berg deals with the history of that
case in a superb way in this essay.
I was privileged to be the United States District Judge who presided over
United States v. Oregon from its filing in 1968 to my ruling in favor of the Indians
and the United States in 1969. For 12 years thereafter I was responsible for
adjudicating many disputes that arose after the initial ruling. At the same time I
tried to keep the parties at the negotiating table. They were trying to devise
permanent rules for the management of the fish resource which would be in
compliance with my ruling. Laura Berg brings home to the reader the difficult
position in which both Indians and non-Indians found themselves.
Until now the principal record of this case was written by the newspapers,
which were often biased against the Indian position and critical of my decision.
The newspaper reports were also frequently inaccurate. The author and her
colleagues at the Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission saw a need for an
accurate account. This essay and her forthcoming book are the result.
Laura Berg examined hundreds of court records in the Gus J. Solomon
United States Courthouse in Portland, Oregon. She researched all earlier
federal cases and conducted in-depth interviews of the participants who are
still living and available. Her work includes enlightening quotes from the
attorneys who participated in the case and elders and historians of the
tribes. I am very pleased that we now have an accurate historical account of
the Columbia River fishing cases in this thoughtful, scholarly, and wellwritten essay and accompanying book.
- Robert C. Belloni, United States District Court for District of Oregon, June 1995
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Let Them Do As They Have Promised1
For native people of the Columbia River, salmon is more than a food, more than a
natural resource. "My strength is from the fish," Chief Meninick told a local courtroom in
1915. For these tribal people, salmon is lifeblood—a vital part of their culture, their religion,
their economic and physical sustenance. They cannot be who they are without salmon.
That is why tribal leaders secured, in 1855, treaties with the United States which
established native peoples' rights to take fish at "all usual and accustomed" places whether
on- or off-reservation. Federal courts have affirmed those rights numerous times.
Today the Nez Perce, Umatilla, Warm Springs, and Yakama tribes continue their overa-century-long struggle to maintain their cultural and spiritual way of life and their connection
to the salmon. To succeed they have relied on their own laws and those of the United States.
Treaty fishing law and its interpretation is an appropriate place to begin a serious
examination of the Pacific salmon story.
IN THE OLD DAYS, there were not date books or pocket calendars.
There was the time ball, a long string of hemp knotted to mark the passage
of time, then conveniently wound into a small ball. When Lewis and Clark's
entourage passed through Columbia River villages during the winter of 1805,
the usual occasion was probably marked by a large knot on the string.
Another bulky knot was no doubt tied when, 50 years later in the
summer of 1855, leaders of tribes and bands who fished along the mighty
Nchiwana or Columbia River, and its tributaries signed treaties with
representatives of the United States.
Since the 1840's—about the time of the Oregon Trail—a steady stream
of settlers had been making its way to the Washington and Oregon
territories. The settlers wanted land. By 1854 the territorial governors had
convinced the United States to start negotiating treaties with the region's
tribes to acquire title to the land. Through the treaty process, territorial and
federal officials also hoped to reduce conflicts between Indians and the nonIndian newcomers. The United States proposed that Indian tribes cede lands
near transportation routes and areas where non-Indians wanted to settle.
Before the treaty talks took place, territorial and army officials brought
word to Indian leaders about the United States' proposals and its wish to
negotiate. Tribal leaders viewed the impending treaty-making with
trepidation, but they had few choices.
In fact, when tribal and U.S. government leaders met at the Walla
Walla treaty grounds, Washington territorial governor Isaac Stevens was
reported to have said, "If they refused to sell, soldiers would be sent to wipe
them off the earth."2 Whether or not such a statement was made, it was
1. This essay is based on an unpublished manuscript, As Long As the Rivers Run A History of United States v. Oregon and Four Tribes' Fight for Columbia River Salmon by Laura
Berg and copyrighted by the Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission.
2.

A. J. Splawn, Ka-Mi-Akin, The Last Hero of the Yakimas, 36-37 (1917).
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always implied. Previous federal policies and the considerable military
presence in Indian country and at the treaty councils suggested the United
States' readiness to use force to impose its will on the Indian people.
Treaties of 1855
Treaty-making in the Pacific Northwest officially began in December 1854
when Governor Isaac Stevens and Joel Palmer, the Superintendent of Indian
Affairs for Oregon Territory, headed cross-country with their horseback caravan
to negotiate agreements with tribes in what are now parts of Washington,
Oregon, Idaho and Montana. Stevens and Palmer took with them soldiers,
interpreters and a standard treaty form they had developed for the treaty
councils. Within seven months, eleven Northwest treaties had been signed.
In May 1855, Stevens and Palmer and tribes and bands associated with
the mid-Columbia area met at an encampment in the Walla Walla Valley.
After two weeks of negotiations, the United States prevailed. Three treaties
were signed;3 two on June 9 and a third on June 11.
The first treaty was made with head chiefs and subchiefs of the Cayuse,
Umatilla, and Walla Walla tribes. Today, these are known as the
Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation.
The second treaty was signed with 14 bands and tribes "who are, for
purposes of this treaty, to be considered one nation under the name of
'Yakama' with Kamaiakun [sic] as its head chief." According to the treaty, the
fourteen were the "Yakima, Palouse, Pisquose, Wenatchapam, Klikatat,
Klinquit, Kow-was-say-ee, Li-ay-was, Skin-pah, Wishram, Shyiks, Ochechoetes, Kah-milt-pah, and Se-ap-cat." Today these fourteen are known as
the Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Indian Nation.
Two days later, the third treaty was made with the Nez Perce bands,
now the Nez Perce Tribe.
From the Walla Walla treaty grounds, Stevens and Palmer went
separate ways. Stevens eventually headed east to treat with other Indian
nations. Palmer headed south into Oregon territory, meeting along the
Columbia at Wasco with four bands of Tenino or Warm Springs (mistakenly
called Walla Wallas in the treaty)—Tygh, Wyam, Tenino, and John Day, and
with three bands of Wascos—Hood River, Dalles, and Kigal-twal (Cascade).
On June 25, a treaty was signed with them under the name of the Middle
Tribes of Oregon.4 Today these are the Confederated Tribes of the Warm
Springs Reservation of Oregon.
In less than a month, over 35 million acres of the Columbia River basin
had been ceded to the United States in four treaties. Sticcas (or variously,
Steachus and Stickus), a Cayuse chief, probably best expressed the Indians'
3. Treaty with the Walla Walla, Cayuse and Umatilla, 1855, 12 Stat. 945; Treaty with the
Yakama, June 9, 1855, 12 Stat. 951; Treaty with the Nez Perces, June 11, 1855, 12 Stat. 957.
4.
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deep sorrow at having to give up most of their homeland: "If your mother
were here in this country who gave you birth, and suckled you, and while you
were sucking, some person came . . . and sold your mother, how would you
feel then? This is our mother, this country . . . ."5
Despite this incredible loss, Indian leaders had signed the treaties
intending that their culture and religion endure. During treaty negotiations,
Old Chief Joseph had advised, "Think for year after year, for a far away
ahead."6 The leadership had. In the agreements, they had reserved for
themselves and for future generations rights that are crucial to their way of life.
[T]he exclusive right of taking fish in the streams running through and
bordering said reservation is hereby secured to said Indians; and at all other
usual and accustomed stations, in common with citizens of the United
States, and of erecting suitable houses for curing the same; also the
privilege of hunting, gathering roots and berries, and pasturing their stock
on unclaimed lands, in common with citizens, is secured to them.7
Much distrust remained after treaties were signed. More and more
whites were coming into Indian country. How would the Indians be
protected? Would the newcomers be prevented from driving the Indians
away from their customary fishing and hunting grounds?
At The Dalles council, Kuck-up of the Tygh Band voiced this concern:
"We do not wish to have our garden joining to the white man's. I wish now to
do as you have said, to live aside from the whites."8 In the treaties the
United States had obligated itself to protect the Indians and their reserved
lands from settlers.
Stevens and Palmer had made reassurances—about the abundance of
and access to salmon, game, roots and berries, and about peace and
protection as well.
"[W]e came here to talk to you like men and to make such arrangements
as to preserve peace and protect you," said General Palmer at Walla Walla. "If
we enter into a treaty now we can select a good country for you; but if we wait
till the country is filled up with whites, where will we find such a place? My
heart [says] that it is better for you to enter into a treaty now with us. . . . If we

5.

Quoted in Hazard Stevens, The Life of Isaac Ingalls Stevens, II 39 (1900).

6. Quoted in David L. Nicandri, Northwest Chiefs: Gustav Sohon's Views of the 1855 Stevens
Treaty Councils, 15 (1986) (from Edward G. Swindell, "Report on the Source, Nature and
Extent of the...Rights of Certain Tribes in Washington and Oregon…." (1942).
7. Treaty with the Middle Tribes of Oregon, June 25, 1855, art. 1. The other
three treaties contain virtually the same language.
8. Quoted in Cynthia Stowell, Faces of a Reservation: A Portrait of the Warm Springs
Indian Reservation, 108 (1987).
315

West

Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 2008

make a treaty with you and our Great Chief and his council approves it, you
can rely on all its provisions being carried out strictly."9
The next day of the treaty talks, Chief Kamiaken of the Yakama had
responded: "Your chiefs are good, perhaps you have spoken straight, that
your children will do what is right. Let them do as they have promised. That
is all I have to say."10
In Defense of the Right to Fish
Virtually as soon as the treaties were signed—and before they were
ratified—conflicts between Indians and non-Indians erupted, many involving
violence. During the following decades, disputes over land and fishing were
commonplace. In 1905, an important case challenging treaty fishing reached
the Supreme Court. In United States v. Winans,11 the Court, finding for the
Yakama tribe, ruled that the treaty fishing right required private property
owners along the Columbia River to allow Indian fishers access to their "usual
and accustomed" fishing places.
In another challenge, Seufert Bros. v. United States,12 the Court agreed with
the Yakama tribe's contention that usual and accustomed fishing places may
indeed be located outside the area ceded by the tribe in its 1855 treaty. In
1942, the Court found in Tulee v. Washington13 that the state of Washington
could not require members of the Yakama tribe to buy state fishing licenses.
Despite these Supreme Court affirmations and the Yakama tribe's
defense of treaty reserved rights, other factors continued to erode tribal
fishers' ability to take salmon, a right Justice McKenna had described in
Winans as "not much less necessary to the existence of the Indians than the
atmosphere they breathed."14
By 1968, environmental degradation, non-Indian interception of
salmon runs before they reached tribal fishing grounds and state fishing
regulations conspired to deny Columbia River tribes the right to harvest the
salmon and the other fish they had reserved in treaties.
In July 1968, fourteen members of the Yakama Indian Nation filed
Sohappy v. Smith15 in the Federal Court for the District of Oregon in Portland.
In their suit, the plaintiffs asked the court to define the treaty fishing right

9. James Doty, "Record of the Official Proceedings at the Council in the Walla
Walla Valley, May 29-June 11, 1855," reprinted in 1855 Yakima Treaty Chronicles, Yakima
Nat'n Rev. 8 (1978).
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Id. at 9.

11.

198 U.S. 371 (1905).

12.

Seufert Bros. v. United States ex rel. Sam Williams, 249 U.S. 194 (1919).

13.

315 U.S. 681 (1942).

14.

198 U.S. at 381.

15.

302 F. Supp. 899 (D. Or. 1969), remanded, 529 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1976).
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and the extent of Oregon's regulatory authority over Indian fishing.
Defendants in the case were Oregon officials.
Meanwhile, the federal government was looking into bringing a federal
action. Assistant Regional Interior Solicitor George Dysart had been helping
defend tribal fishers who had exercised their rights in defiance of state laws.
He had found that defending individual tribal members in state courts was,
he said, "a rather unproductive way to get at the problem."
"First, you're in state court and treaty fishing is a federal question, so it
ought to be in federal court," recalled Dysart, who is now retired. "Second,
you were limited to the specifics of the individual situation."16
"That's when we started looking into bringing a federal action for
declaratory and injunctive relief ahead of time rather than waiting till
somebody had committed a particular violation and we were on the
defensive," he said. Dysart was in the process of convincing the Justice and
Interior departments when the fourteen Yakama members filed their case.
The United States could have simply intervened in Sohappy v. Smith, but
bringing a federal suit against the state of Oregon was more forceful.
Because of state sovereign immunity, the fourteen individual Yakama
plaintiffs could only sue individual state officials. The United States, on the
other hand, could bring suit directly against the state and, if the suit were
successful, bind the actions of state government.
Dysart and other federal officials decided to bring a separate U.S. action,
but not without first having to contend with opposition from several Justice and
Interior department attorneys who Dysart said, believed that states had almost
complete discretion in regulating treaty Indian fishing. But a tenacious Dysart
prevailed. On September 13, 1968, United States v. Oregon17was filed. Joining the
Unites States as plaintiffs in United States v. Oregon were the four tribes with 1855
treaty reserved fishing places on the Columbia River: the Nez Perce Tribe, the
Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, the Confederated Tribes
of the Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon and the Confederated Tribes and
Bands of the Yakama Indian Nation.
The district court's chief judge, Gus J. Solomon, assigned the fishing
cases to a young and recently appointed federal judge, Robert C. Belloni.
The Belloni Decision
"There is no question in my mind that this was the case that had
the most impact on me personally of any case that I've had, and I have
been a judge for over 30 years now," Federal District Judge Robert Belloni
said in 1989.18

16.

Interview with George Dysart (Dec. 6, 1989).

17.

Civil No. 68-513 (D. Or.).

18.

Interview with Judge Robert C. Belloni (Dec. 18, 1989).
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On April 24, 1969, Judge Belloni announced his decision in Sohappy v.
Smith and United States v. Oregon; he had consolidated the two cases (referred
to here as Sohappy/Oregon). Belloni's 1969 decision concluded that Oregon's
restrictions on the treaty Indian fishery were invalid and discriminatory
because, among other things, the state could not prove that they were
necessary for conservation.
In his July 8, 1969 written opinion and decree of October 10, 1969, Belloni
affirmed that in the 1855 treaties, these four Indian tribes had reserved "the right
of taking fish at all usual and accustomed places" and as a consequence, their
members must be accorded "a fair share" of the fish resource.19
Indian treaty fishing rights at "usual and accustomed" places were distinct
from the fishing rights of others.20 The state had argued that treaty Indians have
"only the same rights as given to all other citizens," the judge wrote.21
Belloni ruled that while the state may regulate the treaty Indian offreservation fishery, the state does not have the same latitude as it does in
managing non-Indian fisheries.22 When off-reservation treaty Indian fisheries are
involved, state regulatory powers are limited and bound by certain conditions
and standards. In his opinion and then in his decree, Belloni spelled them out:
•
Regulations must be "reasonable and necessary for conservation."
•
The state must offer proof that particular regulations are
necessary to accomplish conservation needs.
•
Regulations must not discriminate against the Indians.
•
Regulations must be the least restrictive.
•
Fisheries cannot be managed so that little or no harvestable fish reach
the upstream areas where most of the Indian fishing takes place.
•
Treaty fishing rights may not be subordinated to some other
state objective or policy.
•
The protection of treaty fishing rights must be a state regulatory
objective, coequal with its fish conservation objectives.
•
State police powers may be used only if the continued existence
of the fish resource is threatened.
•
Indians may be permitted to fish at places and by means
prohibited to non-Indians.
•
The tribes must have an opportunity for meaningful participation
in the rule-making process.
•
Hearings must be held prior to regulation-setting.23

19.

302 F. Supp. at 911.

20.

Id. at 907.

21.

Id.

22.

Id. at 908, 912.

23. Id. at 908-912; Sohappy v. Smith No. 68-409/United States v. Oregon No. 68-513
Judgment Order (D. Or. 1969).
318

West

Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 2008

In the opinion, Belloni rejected Oregon's argument that statehood and
Congress' 1918 decision to create the Washington/Oregon Columbia River
Compact for joint regulation of the river's commercial fisheries had
somehow diminished the tribes' treaty fishing rights.24 The judge reminded
state officials that they were bound to observe the Indian treaties because,
like international treaties, they were the law of the land.25
In what turned out to be a critical aspect of the decision, Judge Belloni
continued the court's jurisdiction in the Sohappy/Oregon case. Thus, if the plaintiff
tribes believed state regulations did not comply with the court's decree, they
could "seek timely and effective judicial review."26 The tries would not have to
institute a new case to challenge a particular season's fishing regulations.
As a result of his ruling, Belloni predicted in 1969 that "[t]he only effect
will be that some of the fish now taken by sportsmen and commercial
fishermen must be shared with the treaty Indians, as our forefathers
promised over a hundred years ago."27
Non-Indian fishers, however did not want to share. They protested the
decision. State officials and politicians were caught off-guard.
Yet Belloni's ruling was not a radical one in terms of the law. His
opinion was consistent with previous decisions of the Supreme Court, such
as Tulee v. Washington and Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game of Washington.28
Belloni drew from these decisions and from Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla
Indian Reservation v. Maison,29 a ruling in the Oregon district court that had
been upheld by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Belloni's decision might have been less controversial if he had simply
embraced the Supreme Court's Puyallup decision of the previous year. But he
did more than that. Where Justice William O. Douglas had been rather vague
and even obtuse in his Puyallup ruling, Belloni was clear about the nature of
state regulatory authority.
In Puyallup, Douglas emphasized that the state of Washington had the
authority to regulate Indian fisheries in the interests of conservation, but
failed to give clear guidance on how to determine what is "reasonable and
necessary" for conservation. Belloni, on the other hand, began to define how
the conservation standard, first set out in Tulee, was to be applied. He
defined state responsibilities and set limits on state authority.
While Douglas affirmed treaty fishing rights at usual and accustomed
places, he did not indicate if any of these rights were different than rights
shared by non-Indians. Belloni stated in no uncertain terms that treaty

24.

Id. at 912.

25.

Id. at 905.

26.

Id. at 911.

27.

Id.

28.

391 U.S. 392 (1968).

29.

186 F. Supp. 519 {D. Or. 1960), aff'd 314 F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1963).
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Indian fisheries were separate and distinct, which he said meant, among
other things, that non-Indian fishing at Indian fishing places could be
prohibited "without imposing similar restrictions on the treaty Indians."30 In
this line of reasoning, Belloni was taking cues from an earlier decision.
"A case that had immense importance to me was the Maison case that
was written by Judge Solomon, also of this court," Belloni said. "Actually it
has been extremely interesting as a case study in how the law is made. Judge
Solomon wrote an opinion having to do with subsistence fishing, and set a
certain path which logically would be expanded the way I ultimately
expanded it. Some five years later, Judge Boldt came along and expanded
upon mine. It just shows how the law grows in this or any other field."31
In Maison, Judge Solomon ruled that the state could not restrict offreservation fishing without showing that such restriction was necessary for
conservation. Solomon also noted that the state had not pursued other, less
restrictive options for the Indian fishery.32
When H. G. Maison, Superintendent of Oregon State Police, and other
state officials appealed, the Ninth Circuit not only affirmed Solomon's
decision, but also ruled that state-imposed restrictions on treaty fishing
must be indispensable, while restrictions on "the fishing activities of other
citizens are valid if merely reasonable.33 The standards for regulating Indian
and non-Indian fisheries were different.
In his decree, Judge Belloni specifically provided that "this judgment
does not modify or affect in any way the judgment or orders" in the Maison
case.34 With Belloni's incorporation of the Maison conclusions, non-Indian
fisheries had to be regulated for conservation before Indian fisheries could
be lawfully restricted by the states.
The issues of state versus tribal authority over off-reservation treaty
fishing were not argued in the Sohappy and Oregon cases. The plaintiffs
avoided any references to the states having exclusive jurisdiction. Instead
they referred to the states as "one class of agents of the public."35
Thus, Belloni did not address tribal self-regulation, but neither did he
close the door to it. "That wasn't the point directly before me," Belloni said.
The judge's "meaningful participation" requirement, however, would later

30.

Sohappy v. Smith No. 68-409 (D. Or.) Judgment Order Oct. 10, 1969.

31. Belloni Interview. In 1960 Judge Solomon wrote the opinion in Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla
Indian Reservation v. Maison. In 1974, with conflict over treaty fishing rights raging in Washington state,
Federal District Judge George H. Boldt presided over United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D.
Wash. 1974), aff'd and remanded, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 936 (1975).
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32.

186 F. Supp. 519, 520-21 (D. Or. 1960).

33.

314 F.2d 169, 174 (9th Cir. 1963).

34.

Sohappy v. Smith No. 68-409 (D. Or.) Judgment Order Oct. 10, 1969.

35.

Interview with Dysart (Dec. 6, 1989).
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help compel what tribal officials called co-management and what state
officials preferred to call cooperative management.
Another issue the Belloni decision left unaddressed was a definition of
what constituted a "fair and equitable share" of the salmon resource. As history
would have it, these were decisions for another case and another judge.
The Boldt Decision
Meanwhile, in western Washington, tribes were also clashing with state
fish and game agencies over salmon fishing. The fight intensified during the
1960s as it had on the Columbia. Demonstrations and fish-ins accompanied
litigation. However, by 1970 neither Indian protests nor federal court decisions
had improved Washington's treatment of Indian fisheries. The tribes were
calling for federal assistance. As a solicitor for the Interior Department, George
Dysart urged the United States to act. The government hesitated.
According to author Fay Cohen in Treaties on Trial, the conflict peaked in
the summer of 1970: "Indian protest culminated in the establishment of an
encampment along the Puyallup River, which the Indians attempted to
protect with their own security force. Police tried to raze the camp and in the
ensuing melee, a nearby railway trestle was set ablaze. Officers used tear gas
and arrested many Indians."36
That fall, Justice Department attorneys finally filed a complaint against
the state of Washington. Fourteen mostly western Washington tribes and
the Yakama Indian Nation joined the suit. Shortly thereafter, Dysart, tribal
leaders and their attorneys began preparing an in-depth case. On August 27,
1973, after nearly three years of preparation, pretrial motions and hearing,
United States v. Washington went to trial.
Of the Yakama Nation tribes and bands, the Kittitas, Chelan, Entiat,
Columbia, Wenatchee, Klickitat, and Yakima had fished with Puget Sound
tribes. Crossing the Cascades by way of Snoqualmie, Naches, and Stevens
passes, they fished, traded, married, and conducted diplomacy with the
Nisqually, Puyallup, Muckleshoot, and Snoqualmie Indians. At the time
United States v. Washington was filed, some five Yakamas were still engaged in
commercial fishing in the Puget Sound area.
Attorneys for the different parties presented the judge with proposals
for over 500 factual and legal conclusions. While the chief issue at the trial,
which went six days a week for three weeks, were similar to those in
Sohappy/Oregon, the questions now included the matter of a specific
allocation between the Indian and non-Indian fisheries.
Washington Department of Fisheries acknowledged that the tribes
probably had treaty fishing rights and, if so, wanted the court to quantify the
Indian share. In contrast, Washington Department of Game argued that the
36. Fay Cohen, Treaties on Trial: The Continuing Controversy over Northwest Indian
Fishing Rights 80 (1986).
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tribes' treaty fishing rights were no different than non-Indians' rights. When
asked at trial what the Indian allotment should be, a game department
official suggested zero.
On the stand, an Indian spokesperson testified that he believed that
the treaty entitled them to 100 percent of the harvestable fish because, at
the time of the treaty, Indians were catching all of the fish. Using similar
logic, the Yakama tribe argued for more than 90 percent. Federal
government attorneys suggested "an equal share."
On the touchy subject of regulatory authority, some tribes, including
the Yakama tribe, asserted that under the treaties the state had no
jurisdiction over Indian off-reservation fishing. A version of that argument
was expressed in a law review article by Ralph Johnson, a Washington law
professor and one of the attorneys for the Sohappy plaintiffs. Professor
Johnson contended that the notion that states had authority to regulate
Indian fishing was an erroneous interpretation of the treaties that had "crept
into early fishing rights cases, without real legal justification."37
The state, of course, hotly refuted any such contention that might
permit tribal regulation of Indian fisheries.
On February 12, 1974, after several months of deliberation, Judge Boldt
announced his decision, coming to virtually the same conclusions as Belloni
had. His lengthy and well-researched opinion expanded on his colleague's
earlier decision. Writing to Judge Belloni several years later, Boldt
recognized Belloni's legacy and expressed his appreciation for the Oregon
judge: "Your Sohappy decision led the way and made possible United States v.
Washington for which I will always owe you a deep debt of gratitude."38
A very important element of Judge Boldt's decision was his quantification
of the Indian and non-Indian shares. It also created a public furor, which to this
day has not completely subsided. The judge interpreted the treaty language "in
common with citizens of the territory," or, as it reads in some of the 1855
treaties, "in common with citizens of the United States," to mean equal sharing.
Treaty Indian fisheries were thus, he reasoned, entitled to 50 percent of the
harvestable fish passing their "usual and accustomed" fishing places.39
Another important aspect of Boldt's opinion dealt with tribal selfregulation. Reasoning that Congress and the Supreme Court had recognized
tribal self-government and that recent federal legislation such as the Indian
Education and Self-Determination Act of 1973 encouraged tribal autonomy.

37. Ralph Johnson, The States Versus Indian Off-Reservation Fishing: A United States Supreme
Court Error, 47 Wash. L. Rev. 207 (1972). Preceding the United States v. Oregon and United States v.
Washington decisions, Supreme Court opinions had suggested or discussed a conditioned role
for state regulation of off-reservation fishing rights in Winans, Tulee, and Puyallup.
38.

Letter from George H. Boldt to Robert C. Belloni (March 3, 1977).

39. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 343 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd
and remanded 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 936 (1975).
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Boldt concluded that United States v. Washington presented "an appropriate
opportunity . . . to take a step toward applying congressional philosophy to
Indian treaty right[s] fishing in a way that will not be inconsistent with [Supreme
Court cases] and also will provide ample security for the interest and purposes
of conservation."40
Judge Boldt ruled "that any one of the plaintiff tribes is entitled to exercise
its governmental powers by regulating the treaty right fishing of its members
without any state regulation thereof; PROVIDED, however the tribe has and
maintains the qualifications and accepts and abides by the conditions stated."41
The qualifications set by Boldt included having a well-organized tribal
government capable of establishing off-reservation fishing regulations that
"will not adversely affect conservation;" having effective enforcement of
tribal fishing regulations; and having well qualified experts in fishery science
and management "who are either on the tribal staff or whose services are
readily available to the tribe."42
Some of the conditions for self-regulation required that tribal rules be
"discussed in their proposed final form with Fisheries and Game."43 State fish
and game enforcement were to be allowed to monitor off-reservation fishing
"to the extent reasonable and necessary for conservation."44 Tribal catch
reports were to be provided when requested by state fish and game officials
for "reasonable and necessary conservation purposes."44
Judge Boldt also found, based on evidence provided to the court, that
the Yakama and Quinault tribes had already been promulgating and enforcing
tribal fishing regulations and thus were entitled to exercise tribal selfregulation at "usual and accustomed" fishing places in the Puget Sound area.45
Mixed Reviews
"We were in Cascade Locks fishing in 1969, when Belloni made his
decision," said Kathryn Brigham, who fishes there with her husband
Robert.46 Both are Umatilla tribal members. "The fishermen were pleased
with the decisions because it was about time the tribes started doing
something for us. We'd been sitting on the bank and everybody else had
been fishing, and now hopefully we were going to start fishing. So they were
pleased that the tribes finally got the guts to do something. That included

40.

Id. at 340.

41.

Id. at 340.

42.
43.

Id. at 341.
Id.
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Id. at 341.

45.

Id. at 341, 374-375, 379-382.

46.

Interview with Kathryn Brigham (May 22, 1990).
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Yakama, Warm Springs, Umatilla, Nez Perce, everybody was pleased," she
said. Well, not quite everybody.
"The non-Indians weren't. We thought we got along fairly well with the
community in Cascade Locks," said Brigham, who today represents tribes at
the Pacific Salmon Commission, the body overseeing the United StatesCanada Pacific Salmon Treaty. "But then after the Belloni decision, we would
find something done to our tanks, our hoses, and our boats. They would cut
cables, steal the tanks, and even put holes in the boat. It happened on the
river in '69. Then, in 1974 when it was calming down, it started all over again."
"I was surprised at the extreme strong feelings held by not only the
Indians," said Judge Belloni. "Although I knew that the salmon were
important to the tribes, the strength of their feeling was to some extent a
new experience for me. For example, I was ignorant of the actual religious
significance of salmon to the Indian people.
"The reaction of the newspapers was totally adverse, and totally
surprised me," the judge continued. "The interest from the person on the
street - I thought this was a matter they would read about in the newspapers
and then say 'ho-hum' and forget about it. But that's not what happened.
Fishermen of all kinds, the sports and commercial fishermen, reacted a lot
stronger than I ever thought they would."
Belloni said he was "so doggone unhappy" that news reporters,
editors, and even his friends who were commercial fishermen didn't bother
to read the opinion.
Judge Belloni remembered that Peterson Seafood, a processing plant
in Charleston on the Oregon coast near where he used to fish, "had this big
cartoon of two loggers sitting on a bench having their lunch and one logger
saying to the other, 'I don't care what Belloni says, I'm not going to give half
this tuna fish sandwich to the Indians.'" A bumper sticker with a bolt and a
sausage on it read, "Screw Boldt and Slice Belloni." Another popular one
made no mistake about its sentiment; it urged, "Save a fish, Can an Indian."
When several non-Indian commercial fishermen lost their lives at sea in the
early 1980's, stories in the Seattle Times and The Oregonian implied that the Belloni and
Boldt decisions were responsible. The articles' authors reasoned that non-Indian
fishers were having to risk their lives to harvest enough fish now that Indians were
allowed to increase their take of salmon. Washington state officials openly defied
the federal court decisions. Their refusal to adopt regulations implementing the
rulings and the state's counter suits brought the United States v. Washington and Oregon
parties back to court again and again. Statements made to the media and before the
legislature and courts inflamed the public. Apparently Belloni's decision was radical
in terms of the social and political climate of the times.
"The politicians, likewise, even the courts, the state courts reacted a lot
more strongly than I ever thought they would," Judge Belloni said. "A person
shouldn't use too strong a language, but I think some of the state court
actions in the state of Washington as a result of this were almost
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disgraceful," he declared. For more than several years after the Boldt decision,
Washington state courts attempted to overturn federal court orders.
In a case challenging much of the substance of United States v.
Washington and United States v. Oregon, appeals court judge Alfred T.
Goodwin wrote:
The state's [Washington's] extraordinary machinations in resisting
the decree have forced the district court to take over a large share of
the management of the state's fishery in order to enforce its
decrees. Except for some desegregation cases . . . the district court
has faced the most concerted official and private efforts to frustrate
a decree of a federal court witnessed this century.47
In upholding Boldt's decision, Ninth Circuit Judge James M. Burns also
commented: "The record in this case, and the history set forth in the Puyallup
and Antoine cases, among others, make it crystal clear that it has been the
recalcitrance of Washington state officials (and their vocal non-Indian
commercial and sports fishing allies) which produced the denial of Indian
rights requiring intervention by the district court. This responsibility should
neither escape notice nor be forgotten."48
It was not only Washington state officials that had trouble reconciling the
decisions. Even federal policy makers were confused, among them the director
of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. When he was advised of Judge Boldt's
ruling that the Indian entitlement was 50 percent of the harvestable fish, his
response was that the Fish and Wildlife Service would certainly have appealed
that decision. The informant had to advise the director that the ruling had been
the position of the United States, and that the United States had won.49
Some have puzzled over the response to Belloni's 1969 ruling in
contrast to the explosion over Boldt's decision five years later. After his
ruling, Judge Boldt received hundreds of hate calls and letters berating him.
Demonstrators hung him in effigy. "This 'very careful and scholarly judge,' as
Belloni referred to him, was vilified for having done the right thing," said
James B. Hovis, who for over thirty years was the Yakama Tribal Attorney and
is now a federal magistrate.50
Timing and economics help explain the different reactions. Between
the two decisions, non-Indian challenges to Indian fishing rights had
multiplied. Boldt believed that it had become necessary to specifically
quantify the treaty Indian entitlement, and when he did so, he enraged a
segment of the fishing community and its supporters who held dearly to the
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Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. United States District Court, 573 F.2d 1123, 1126
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United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 693 (1975) (Burns, J., concurring).
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Interview with James B. Hovis (February 7, 1990).
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notion that the salmon resource was all theirs. Moreover, in the 1970s more
people and more money were involved in the fish business on the Washington
coast and in Puget Sound than were involved on the Columbia River.
Herbert Lundy of The Oregonian editorialized in 1974, "Non-Indian
fishermen who strung up an effigy of U.S. District Judge George Boldt in a
fishnet in front of the federal court in Tacoma, Washington were hanging the
wrong man." In what is a fair appraisal of the treaty fishing rights decisions,
Lundy wrote that those most responsible were actually Robert Belloni,
whose ruling Boldt used as a foundation, and Isaac Stevens, who had agreed
to the reservation of fishing rights when he negotiated the 1855 treaties.51
"The original '69 decision has to be recognized as a real landmark
decision in its time," said Nez Perce tribal attorney Doug Nash.52 "Judge
Belloni came up with rulings and guiding principles that set the stage for an
awful lot of law thereafter."
"There were some decisions before his that addressed the nature and
extent of treaty reserved fishing rights, and some addressed the scope of state
regulation, but I think until that first decision, there weren't as many that
affected certainly as many tribes and as many treaties, and on a broad scope
that his did. At the time of his decision, none had really jelled the concept of
what 'usual and accustomed' might mean. His did. His was the building block
for everything after, including United States v. Washington," said Nash.
As to Boldt's 50 percent sharing decision, Nash conveyed the sentiment of
the Umatillas, who were his clients during the mid-70s: "It was within the realm
of acceptance. Trying to get the states to manage it so that tribes got 50 percent
was still a pretty uphill battle at the time. It wasn't an easy thing for [the states]
to accept, let alone manage and make available to the tribes."
Nez Perce tribal leader Allen Slickpoo confirmed that his tribe, too,
"especially the fishermen, hailed the Belloni decision as a big victory for the
Nez Perce people. The Boldt decision also strengthened our treaty rights."53
While Warm Springs officials were satisfied with Boldt's decision, they were
absolutely delighted with Belloni's. As a result of the Sohappy/Oregon case, the tribe’s
1865 treaty had been rejected and its 1855 treaty rights affirmed. The Warm Springs
would no longer have to wonder whether the federal government believed the tribe
still had off-reservation rights. According to tribal fish and wildlife committeeman
Delbert Frank, this was when things began to get difficult, now "we had to start
managing for the survival of the salmon."54
Yakama leaders, in contrast, were disappointed with the Sohappy/Oregon
decision. "The one problem I've always had with the case was that the states
finally got their foot in the door," former tribal chairman Johnson Meninick
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related.55 "We were looking for a good case, but not Sohappy v. Smith. It was
really kind of a bad case to try."
Before the 1969 decision, the Yakama tribe was pursuing a treaty rights
strategy that involved tribal regulation. The tribe was fighting off state
regulations in state courts, and winning.
In fact, on the day Judge Belloni announced this decision, a wire service
story in the Oregon Journal confirmed that at least in Wasco County the judicial
system was backing off. The article said that Wasco County District Attorney Don
Turner was dismissing charges against Indians fishing on the Columbia "on
grounds that they are granted such rights based on treaties."56
Also, several months before Belloni's initial 1969 ruling, the Washington Court
of Appeals in State v. James affirmed a Skamania County judge's decision to dismiss
charges against a Yakama fisherman. In December 1966, state judge Ross Rakow
had concluded that Ernest James was fishing at a "usual and customary" fishing site
and that state regulations had not been valid because they were not "reasonable
and necessary for conservation."57
The Yakama tribe and its attorney were winning legal battles in
state courts. "So we weren't a bit interested in going into federal
court," said Jim Hovis, who for over 30 years was Yakama tribal
attorney and is now a federal magistrate. 58
"The Yakama Indian Nation did intervene," said Bill Yallup, Sr., Yakama
fish and wildlife official and former tribal judge, "because Sohappy and the
other 13 were saying that they had individual rights. So to clarify the legal
question of Indian treaty fishing rights, the tribe had to step in and say,
'These are Yakama treaty rights and we don't want the federal court deciding
this issue without the tribe's intervention."59
"We had to be there to protect a resource which our forefathers left for
us to live by, not just for certain people or certain tribal members," said
Meninick, who now works in cultural resources. "It was the tribe-as-a-whole's
resource. The tribe's right was being jeopardized."
He went on to explain that even though the court did nothing to favor
individual treaty rights, the Sohappy/Oregon case "in a sense, discredited us."
The tribe was regulating its own fisheries and trying to gain compliance from
all its members, when the court said the state could manage Indian
fisheries. "We weren't asleep on the job," Meninick emphasized.
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"Belloni was the foundation," Hovis acknowledged. "If it hadn't been
for United States v. Oregon, there wouldn't be United States v. Washington. The
only thing I regretted was that he said the state had the right to regulate."
"The fish committees of these other tribes I don't think wanted the
responsibilities [of tribal regulation]," Hovis contended. "They're bright
people—they saw how the Yakama fish committees got beat up. They saw what
happened politically to the chairmen of the fish committees who were trying to
regulate the fishermen. So they didn't give a damn about tribal regulation."
"I think their attorneys felt, 'All we need is to have some kind of a hook
on the state. We don't want to get into tribal regulation.'"
"A concept of self-regulation was pretty remote especially in those
early days," said Nash, reflecting on his experience in the 1970s. "Most
tribes, certainly the Umatillas, just had zero fishery staff and they weren't
doing anything in fisheries management, so the concept of actually having
some internal tribal process that could affect the Columbia River regulation
was probably beyond everyone's wildest dreams at the time."
Other tribes' leaders and attorneys also felt that tribal self-regulation,
particularly to the exclusion of state regulation, was an unlikely proposition for
several reasons. First, case law had affirmed a role for state authorities "when
necessary for conservation." Second, despite the tribes' conservative and prayerful
practices on behalf of salmon, non-Indian exploitation of land and water
resources had already wiped out some salmon stocks and brought others to
dangerous lows. There was, as some termed it, a "conservation situation."
Yakama leaders and their attorneys who had argued for recognition of
tribal management in both cases felt that they had been more successful in
United States v. Washington. But many Yakama leaders were shocked and
dismayed by Boldt's decision to give 50 percent of the salmon passing by
the tribes' usual and accustomed fishing places to non-Indians.
Yallup explained that the tribe had argued that it was legally entitled,
under the treaty, to a 95 percent share of the fish. After all, at the time of the
treaty when the tribes reserved their fishing rights, the Indians were catching
virtually all the fish. The non-Indians were traders and soldiers.
"Why go out and break your back hauling fish, when you can take a
yard of cloth and trade for enough fish to fill a house?" Hovis asked.
"'In common' doesn't mean 50-50? You go out and ask people, 'What
does 'in common' mean?' Nobody's going to tell you 50-50," he said. "But
that was the only way Boldt could save fisheries for the state."
"Then non-Indians started talking about the 50-50 decision as being immoral,
improper, illegal, and they killed off the old gentleman [Judge Boldt]. It was
shameful," Hovis paused. "In retrospect, we had such a hell of a time politically
holding on to the 50 percent, how would we have done with 90 percent?"
When Boldt divided the harvest 50-50, Delbert Frank said that he and his
people weren't disappointed. "The Yakamas thought we should have it all. But I
was satisfied with what we got. It was better than nothing, because we always
got nothing when we finally got to court," he remarked. Frank said he was more

328

West

Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 2008

concerned about getting something done for the resource so that 50 percent
could be a meaningful number. "Fifty percent of zero is still zero."
Warm Springs tribal attorney Dennis Karnopp indicated that the
allocation could have easily been 33 percent. During the Boldt ruling, some
state officials had advocated shares of a third each for the sport, Indian, and
non-Indian commercial fisheries, he recalled.60
In May 1974, Judge Belloni endorsed Boldt's 50-50 concept for
Columbia River harvest sharing. In the years to come, the tribes and their
attorneys would learn just how difficult it was going to be to get that 50
percent "fair and equitable share."61
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